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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the evolution of monetary policy design in Australia over the past 
quarter of a century culminating recently in the adoption of an inflation targeting approach 
through the institutional mechanism of CBI (Central Bank Independence). Cross-country 
empirics have repeatedly confirmed the stylized fact that high CBI delivers low inflation. 
This study covers new ground by using time-series techniques to test the nexus between CBI 
and inflation using Australian quarterly time-series data for the sample period 1973Q3-
1998Q4. The theoretical analysis based on a quadratic social loss function subject to a Lucas 
supply curve demonstrates that the exclusive focus on the institutional mechanism of CBI to 
reduce inflation bias may be flawed because it ignores the spillover effects of macroeconomic 
distortions on inflation. Time-series composite indices were constructed to proxy CBI and 
macroeconomic distortions in the labour market, the tax system and in the arena of 
international competition. The general-to-specific methodology was applied to sequentially 
derive a parsimonious VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) linking CBI and 
macroeconomic distortions to inflation during the study period. Granger causality tests 
indicated that both CBI and macroeconomic distortions Granger caused inflation. The VECM 
empirics revealed that CBI and neocorporatism contributed in a significant manner to 
reduction of inflation during the study period. The fact that neocorporatism curbed inflation 
during the study period raises the issue that the industrial relations reforms agenda aimed at 
eroding neocorporatism are politically motivated and lack an economic rationale. However, 
when the link between inflation and neocorporatism was reanalyzed taking feedback effects 
into account using the VAR methodology a different picture emerged. The impulse response 
functions revealed that an increase in neocorporatism exacerbated inflation in the short run. 
Thus the VAR empirics therefore provided a rationale for the labour market reforms aimed at 
rectifying labour market distortion attributed to neocorporatism. Both the VECM and VAR 
empirics make a strong case for tax reform in order to reduce welfare payments without 
compromising on safety net and equity issues. It also makes a case for reducing the volatility 
or the real exchange rate to sharpen Australia’s competitive edge. The significance of 
macroeconomic distortions in causing output to deviate from potential underscore that the 
policy reaction function is influenced by distortions. Non-nested tests revealed that the Taylor 
rule taking account of deviations of output from potential due to macro distortions was 
superior to an inflation rate only rule. Therefore the study results recommend that 
policymaker (Reserve Bank of Australia) should pursue a Taylor rule rather than inflation 
rate only rule in smoothing the overnight cash rate to achieve the pre-announced inflation 
target. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The adoption of inflation targeting as the primary goal of monetary policy has been 
rationalized by game-theoretic and principal-agent approaches designed to enhance policy 
credibility and thereby reduce inflation bias (Muscatelli, 1998; Pearson and Tabellini, 1993; 
Walsh, 1995). The inflation targeting approach to monetary policy has evolved over the past 
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century with its intellectual pedigree traced to the writings of Marshall (1887), Wicksell 
(1898), Fisher (1911) and Keynes (1923). Moreover the analytical difference between 
inflation targeting and its forebears such as exchange rate and monetary targeting is regarded 
as a matter of semantics rather than economics (Haldane, 1998:3). Therefore, this study 
analyses the evolution of monetary policy design over the quarter of a century using quarterly 
time-series data (1973Q3-1999Q3). Numerous cross-country studies have repeatedly 
confirmed that the institutional innovation CBI (Central Bank Independence), a the pivotal 
mechanism for inflation targeting, has delivered the stylised fact of low inflation with the 
"free lunch" of an improved macroeconomic performance (Alsenia, 1988; Cukeriman, 1992). 
In this study we attempt to cover new ground by examining whether CBI over time has 
delivered low inflation. For this purpose a time-series composite index of CBI was 
constructed using the same ingredients used in the cross-country studies. Furthermore, based 
on theoretical insights, we contend that the exclusive focus on CBI in contemporary monetary 
policy design may be misplaced. This is because this institutional approach virtually neglects 
important macroeconomic distortions that may destabilize output and exacerbate inflation 
bias. In this study an attempt has been made to identify and construct proxy time-series 
indices for the various macroeconomic distortions in the labour market, the tax system and in 
the arena of international competition that could have spillover effects on inflation bias. 
Several dynamic econometric modeling techniques have been used to analyze the nexus 
between inflation and CBI after controlling for the macroeconomic distortions.  
 
Inflation targeting or the achievement of a pre-announced numerical inflation target over the 
business cycle is currently the primary goal of monetary policy in Australia. However, the 
evolution of monetary policy design in Australia and in other advanced economies reveals 
that monetary authorities have used different targets (exchange rate anchors, monetary and 
interest rate targets) to combat the bugbear of inflation. The theoretical debate on monetary 
policy in the shape of rules versus discretion has emphasized that rules or targeting deliver 
optimal inflation outcomes by anchoring inflationary expectations compared to the sub-
optimal outcomes that result from policy discretion. Policy discretion allows scope for time-
inconsistent behavior as policymakers could renege on their policy commitments for short-
run gains (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1988; Calvo, 1978). These short-
run gains result in the long-run social deadweight loss of policy credibility resulting in the 
exacerbation of inflation bias.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the obsession of monetary policy with 
the inflation bugbear. The evolution of monetary policy design to tackle inflation in Australia 
over the past quarter of a century is analyzed in terms of episodes or sub-periods highlighting 
the influence of macroeconomic paradigms on policy formulation. Section 3 models the 
conventional wisdom on inflation targeting based on minimizing a quadratic social loss 
function subject to a Lucas supply curve. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the 
exclusive focus on CBI to increase inflation aversion and reduce inflation bias may gloss over 
important feedback effects of macroeconomic distortions on inflation bias. Section 4 
enumerates the alternative institutional mechanisms that could deliver low inflation in the 
same way as CBI. The self-contradictory nature of the principal-agent approach to inflation 
curbing is noted, although the glossing over of the feedback effects of macroeconomic 
distortion inflation bias is regarded as more serious. Section 5 explains the construction of 
composite indices to proxy CBI and the macroeconomic distortions in the labour market, the 
tax system and in the arena of international competition that impinge on inflation bias. 
Section 6 presents the unit root and cointegration tests that preceded the derivation of a 
parsimonious Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) using the general to specific 
methodology. The Granger causality tests based on the VECM model reveal that both CBI 
and the distortion variables Granger caused inflation. The augmented VECM also provides an 
 3 
 
estimate of the historical sacrifice ratio of 1.8%. The VECM empirics reveal that 
neocorporatism curbed inflation during the study period, thereby raising questions about the 
current labour market reforms aimed at diluting neocorporatism. Section 7 presents results of 
the application of the VAR methodology whereby the feedback effects of the monetary 
system variable on inflation are analyzed in terms of impulse response functions and forecast 
error variance decompositions. The empirical results reveal that increase in neocorporatism 
can exacerbate inflation in the short run. Thus, the VAR empirics provide a rationale for the 
current agenda for labour market reforms aimed at eroding the labour market distortion as 
embodied in neocorporatism. Furthermore, the empirics reveal that one standard deviation 
positive innovation to CBI permanently reduces inflation by about 5% over the long-run 
forecast horizon. Section 8 concludes the paper by recommending that policymakers’ reaction 
function for setting the short-term interest rate should be a Taylor rule rather than an inflation 
only rule in view of the significance of macroeconomic distortions in the Australian monetary 
policy design aimed at targeting inflation. 
 
 
2.  THE INFLATION BUGBEAR AND THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY 
POLICY DESIGN 
 
Inflation arises either because too much money chases too few goods or because the increase 
in money wages outstrips labour productivity. Inflation could be caused by either demand-
pull or supply-side cost-push factors. In the policy literature no other variable has been more 
demonized than inflation. It has been tagged the public enemy number one, a thief, a scourge 
and the debaucher of the capitalist economy (attributed to Lenin). Macroeconomic theory 
explains that inflation causes high transactions or ‘shoe-leather’ costs because it reduces real 
balances by raising interest rates. It entails ‘menu costs’ or price changes resulting in ‘noise’ 
that distorts the price signal leading to coordination failures and the misallocation of 
resources. It has been chastised for ‘bracket creep’ that erodes the earnings of fixed income 
earners and pensioners. Unanticipated inflation favors creditors against debtors resulting in 
risk adverse behavior and the postponement of trade and investment decision. It generates a 
bias against real capital gains and in favor of nominal gains and thus contributes to tax 
distortions and investment misallocation. Moreover in an open economy if the exchange rate 
is pegged the real exchange rate does not adjust to reflect true competitiveness. If the 
exchange rate were floating inflation could generate excessive volatility and thus undermine 
confidence in trade and investment with detrimental effects on long-term growth. Despite the 
widespread concerns about the baneful effects of inflation the static welfare gains, as a ratio 
of GDP due to a 1-% disinflation appears to be a minuscule 0.0005% when measured using 
Harberger triangles. However, the dynamic permanent welfare gain due to a disinflation of 
1% is estimated to deliver a massive steady state welfare gain 18% as a ratio of GDP, for a 
sacrifice ratio of 1.8% when discounted using a social discount rate r=5% and a growth 
rate=2%. This result is based on the NPV formula B/(r-g)=0.18/(0.05-0.04=18% suggested by 
(Haldane, 1997).  
 
The evolution of monetary policy design in Australia as in most other countries demonstrates 
the over riding concern of the policymakers to achieve the target of low inflation through the 
deployment of various policy Instruments. The Charter of the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA Act, 1959) specified that it should achieve the three goals of full employment, growth 
or national prosperity and low inflation or price stability. The evolution of monetary policy 
during the study period clearly demonstrates how the choice of policy instruments and 
intermediate targets for curbing inflation bias was influenced by the dominant 
macroeconomic paradigm of the day.  
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The evolution of monetary policy design in Australia during the study period (1973Q3 – 
1998Q3) has been categorized into various sub-periods or episodes. In Episode 1 (1973Q4-
1976Q1) the pegged exchange rate provided the nominal anchor to impose price discipline 
and weigh down inflationary expectations. During Episode 1 under the influence of the 
dominant Keynesian paradigm policymakers used the levers of monetary and fiscal policy to 
fine-tune demand and stabilize the business cycle. During Episode 2 (1976Q2-1985Q1) under 
the influence of monetarism a constant money growth rate rule or monetary targeting based 
on the monetary aggregate (M3) was practiced with the aim of countering the destabilizing 
effects of long and variable policy lags. However, financial innovations and disintermediation 
unleashed by the forces of financial deregulation undermined the stable transmission 
mechanism that underpinned the money demand and velocity functions. This led to the 
abandonment of monetary targeting in early 1985. In Episode 3 (1985Q2-89Q4) the checklist 
approach or an array of macroeconomic indicators was used to guide monetary policy. 
However, the checklist of policy indicators virtually opened the door to the practice of 
unbridled discretionary policy severely undermining policy accountability and credibility. 
The misery index skyrocketed and a severe recession occurred during this episode. During 
Episode 4 (1990Q1-1992Q4) there was a quiet policy reversal from the multiple goal 
checklist approach to a single instrument geared to curb inflation. The RBA (Reserve Bank of 
Australia) had adopted the nominal short-term interest rate (the overnight cash rate) as its 
policy instrument for implementing monetary policy and controlling the inflation bugbear. 
The superiority of interest rate targeting vis-à-vis monetary targeting for delivering output 
stabilisation during this episode when the economy was exposed more to monetary rather 
than real shocks received theoretical support (Poole, 1970). In Episode 5 (1993Q1-1996Q2) 
the RBA engaged in a covert shift to the dual targeting of both inflation and output. However, 
because of a simmering political feud between the incumbent Treasurer and the Leader of the 
Opposition regarding the merits of inflation targeting the RBA kept under wraps its operation 
of the dual inflation output targeting policy framework. During Episode 6 (1996Q3-1998Q3) 
the Treasurer of the newly elected Coalition government announced that the RBA would be 
granted CBI so that it could achieve the sole aim of monetary policy: the attainment of a pre-
announced ‘thick point’ inflation target of 2-3% over the business cycle. The granting of CBI 
to achieve the numerical inflation target was a key institutional innovation of the new 
monetary policy design introduced during this episode. Table 1 below recaps the salient 
episodes in the evolution of monetary policy design in Australia during the study period.  
 
 
Table 1   The evolution of monetary policy design in Australia (1973- 98) 
Episode Monetary policy design Paradigm 
I.  (73Q4-76Q1) Exchange rate anchor Keynesian fine-tuning 
II.(76Q2-85Q1) Monetary (M3) targeting Friedmanite rules 
III.(85Q2-89Q4) Check-list approach Unbridled discretion 
IV.(90Q1-92Q4 Interest rate targeting Poole analytics 
V. (93Q1-96Q2) Inflation & output targeting Dual targeting 
VI.(96Q3-98Q3) Inflation targeting & CBI Time-inconsistency problem 
Sources: Macfarlane (1998); Grenville (1997) 
 
 
Australia’s adoption of the inflation-targeting framework to conduct monetary policy in 1993 
announced a thick-point to be achieved over the business cycle. The thick point or the 
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numerical range of 2-3% for the inflation target was specified in terms of changes in the 
consumer price index (CPI). It aimed to capture the Hicksian notion of a cost of living index. 
But it suffered from a serious mismeasurement of at least 1% due to the failure to account for 
the changes in quality and the introduction of new goods into the consumption basket or the 
weight diagram in the Lasperyres’ CPI index (Boskin, 1996). Besides the measurement bias, 
the need to provide a lubrication through real wage and real interest adjustments provides 
further explanations as to why inflation targets have been fixed as a positive number (see 
Table 2) rather than at the theoretical optimum of zero (Akerlof et al., 1996). 
 
Table 2   The Inflation Targeting (IT) League 
 
Country Year/Qtr Target % Measure 
1.N Zealand 1990Q1 0-3 CPI 
2. Canada 1991Q1 1-2 CPI 
3. UK 1992Q3 1-2.5 RPI 
4.Sweden 1993Q1 1-2 CPI 
5. Finland 1993Q1 2 CPI 
6. Australia 1993Q1 2-3 CPI 
7. Spain 1994Q2 3.5- 4 CPI 
Source: Bank for International Settlement, Annual Report 1996. 
Notes: Measures: CPI: Consumer Price Index. RPI: Retail Price Index 
 
 
3.  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK UNDERPINNING MONETARY 
POLICY DESIGN  
 
The conventional wisdom on monetary policy design incorporating the time-inconsistency 
problem has been reformulated in a game theoretic framework (Backus and Driffil, 1985) and 
explained heuristically in the context of reneging on wage agreements (Goodhart, 1994). The 
institutional mechanism of CBI has been shown to be the circuit breaker that removes the 
principal (the government) from making the agent (the central bank) from abandoning policy 
commitments to achieve short run gains motivated by the political business cycle. In the 
process monetary policy credibility and reputation of the central bank is irrevocably 
damaged. Cross-section empirical studies have shown that granting of CBI or similar 
alternative mechanisms reduce inflation bias by increasing inflation aversion. The algebraic 
exposition of this received theory whilst confirming that the reinforcing of the institutional 
mechanisms such as CBI can reduce inflationary bias ignores the fact that macroeconomic 
distortions too can contribute to inflation bias through increase in output variability. 
Therefore monetary policy design with an exclusive focus on the institutional remedy of CBI 
to achieve inflation targets may be flawed.    
 
The algebraic structure of the basic model or the conventional wisdom related to modern 
monetary policy design can be represented in terms of a quadratic loss function (L) 
comprising the quadratic loss arguments of the inflation rate (πt ) deviating from its social 
optimum (πt∗ =0) and the GDP or output (yt) deviating from its natural rate (y t *) as defined 
by the function (1).   
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 L = γ(π t −π t∗)2  +( yt - δy t*)2 (1) 
 
The policymakers’  pre-commitment to fight inflation or inflation aversion is quantified by 
the weight accorded to the parameter (γ). The deviation of output from the natural rate is 
captured by the distortion parameter 0<δ < 1 (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989:56).  
 
The Lucas supply curve captures the policymakers’ scope for bringing output above the 
natural rate (y*) which is the optimal output in the absence of policy surprises. Thus, the 
Lucas supply or equivalently a short-run Phillips curve given by equation (2) reveals that 
policy surprises could ratchet output above the natural rate of output, thereby generating a 
positive inflation bias or the actual inflation rate to exceed the socially optimal expected 
inflation rate. 
 
 yt = yt * +( πt −π t e )  .. (2) 
 
The quadratic loss function (1) subject to the Lucas curve constraint (2) yields the following 
quadratic function: 
 
 L = γπ t 2  +[(1-δ)y t *+( π t −π t e )]2  (3) 
 
The first order condition for the minimization of the above quadratic function with respect to 
inflation yields the following policy reaction function: 
 
 (dL/dπ t )  =  2γπ t  +2 [(1-δ)y t *+( π t −π t e )]  = 0 (4) 
 
After rearranging we obtain the policy reaction function below: 
  
          π  T   = [( δ−1)y t *+π t e ]/(1+γ) (5) 
         
Under rational expectations, where πte= π t   the optimal solution to the policy reaction 
function  (5) is given by: 
 
          π  t = [( δ−1)y t *  ]/γ (6) 
 
In the above solution the parameter γ defines the weight attached to the policymakers’ 
inflation aversion parameter. Contemporary monetary policy design emphasizes the role of 
institutional mechanisms that would enhance the inflation aversion parameter (γ) thereby 
causing a reduction of inflationary bias. However, equation (6) demonstrates that the inflation 
bias could also be reduced by reducing the degree of macroeconomic distortions measured by 
(1-δ). Therefore, although  πt ->0, if γ −>∞  or  (1−δ) −> 0;  the latter has been glossed over in 
contemporary monetary policy design. 
 
The institutional innovation of CBI that constitutes the nub of contemporary monetary policy 
design is linked to the raising of the aversion parameter (γ) in order to reduce inflation bias. 
In the process contemporary monetary policy design has glossed over the importance of the 
spillover effects of macroeconomic distortions (1−δ) in nurturing inflation bias. One of the 
primary aims of this study is to empirically analyze the contributions of these macroeconomic 
distortions to inflation bias after controlling for the effects of CBI. 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR ENHANCING INFLATION 
AVERSION 
 
Contemporary monetary policy design has assigned the institutional innovation of CBI 
(Central Bank Independence), whereby the principal (government) delegates to the agent (the 
central bank) independence in setting the policy instrument to achieve a pre-committed 
inflation target. Thus the principal circumscribes the scope for discretionary policy action and 
thereby increases policy credibility, which reduces inflationary bias. The granting of CBI has 
been either in the form of policy statement or through a legal enactment and emphasizes that 
the central bank has autonomy in setting the policy instruments to achieve a pre-committed 
inflation target.  The contemporary literature on monetary policy design reveals that the 
reduction of inflation bias by eliminating the scope for time-inconsistent policy behavior can 
be achieved in several alternative ways. First, by the appointment of a conservative central 
banker who is committed to the reduction of inflation rather than output stabilisation (Rogoff, 
1985). Second, by implementing an incentive contract whereby the incumbent governor 
could be penalized  if he fails to achieve the  pre-announced inflation target (Walsh, 1995). 
Third, by specifying the numerical magnitude of the inflation target that has to be achieved 
(Svensson, 1995; 1997). Fourth, by stipulating that the fixed rule of an inflation target should 
be achieved whilst making provision for an escape clause to cope with unforeseen 
contingencies that could emerge due to supply shocks (Lohmann, 1992). Fifth, by the 
implementation of ironclad or legally mandated inflation targets (Green, 1996, Stemp, 1997). 
Sixth, by the central bank building a reputation or a good track record as inflation fighter 
thereby enhancing policy credibility – a proposition that has been illustrated using multi-
period modeling of policy credibility (Barro and Gordon, 1983). It has been argued that that 
in the face of the central bank's preference uncertainty the discretionary approach would be 
superior to the delegation of CBI by contracts and target prescriptions. Furthermore, if the 
central bank has private information about supply shocks the granting of goal independence 
in addition to instrument independence would be preferable, provided accountability of the 
central bank is ensured by imposing penalties in the event of failing to meet the pre-
announced inflation targets (Muscatelli, 1998). However, others contend that the optimal 
combination of an incentive contract with inflation targets would be superior as it would 
eliminate inflation bias and output variability that is not generated by supply shocks (Beetsma 
and Jensen, 1998). Some analysts doubt whether the agent, the central bank, may have 
preferences that are independent from those of the government (McCallum, 1995) and others 
express reservations about the effectiveness of imposition of penalties on governors who fail 
to achieve inflation targets (Blinder, 1995). Table 3 summarizes the various institutional  
 
 
Table 3    Institutional mechanisms for reinforcing inflation aversion (γ) 
 
Institutional Mechanism Proponents 
0. CBI (Legal & instrument independence) Alseina (1988), Cukierman (1992) 
1. Appointment of a conservative central banker Rogoff (1985) 
2. Optimal incentive contract with penalties Walsh (1995) 
3. Numerical Inflation targets based on forecasts Svensson (1997) 
4. Inflation target or rule with an escape clause Lohmann (1992) 
5. Ironclad or legally mandated inflation targets Green(1996), Stemp (1997) 
6.  Reputation and policy credibility Barro and Gordon, (1983); Chang (1998) 
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mechanisms that vie with CBI to deliver on inflation targets policy design. Nonetheless, these 
institutional mechanisms fail to tackle head on the spillover effects of macroeconomic 
distortions on inflation bias operating either via output variability or through other 
transmission channels.   
 
The elimination of macroeconomic distortions has long occupied a top billing on the agenda 
of economic policy reform. In the Australian context the debate on policy reforms has 
increasingly focused on the need to eliminate distortions in the labour market, the tax system 
and in the sphere of international competition in order to galvanise the Australian economy. 
In this study we contend that the contemporary monetary policy designs that focus 
exclusively on inflation targeting to the virtual exclusion of the need to tackle 
macroeconomic distortions needs to be reviewed. Besides, the macroeconomic distortions 
include: first, the case for revamping the industrial relations system in order to infuse labour 
market flexibility. Second, distortions underline the case for overhauling the tax system by 
reconfiguring welfare expenditure out of tax revenue in such a manner that efficiency would 
be delivered without compromising equity. Third, the case for sharpening the edge of 
international competitiveness by reducing volatility and uncertainty that causes the 
postponement of investment and trade decision is highlighted. In the next section we discuss 
how empirical analysis can shed light on the links between the macroeconomic distortions 
and inflation bias after controlling for the institutional mechanism of CBI.  
 
 
5. MACROECONOMIC DISTORTIONS AND INFLATIONARY BIAS 
 
In this section we explain the various factors that were taken into account in the construction 
of composite time-series indicators to measure (CBIt). Also the other macroeconomic 
distortions relating to the labour market have been captured by the index of neocorporatism 
(NCIt) showing the efficacy of centralized wage fixing principles; the welfare benefits to tax 
revenue ratio proxying the efficacy of the tax system (BTXt) and the index of international 
competitiveness has been proxied by an index of volatility (VOLt) reflecting distortions 
impinging on international trade and investment. 
 
CBIt (Central Bank Independence) Index 
 
The time-series proxy for CBIt index for Australia was compiled by assigning scores to ten 
sub-indices to take account of legal, policy instrument, operational and goal independence, 
factors such as transparency and accountability (see Table 4 and Appendix Table 3a). The 
sub-indices used for measuring CBI indices were analogous to those used in the cross-
country studies (Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapati, 1992). Since most of the 
sub-indices were highly correlated a composite index based on the average of the sub-indices 
was used as the measure of CBI for this study. The composite CBIt index reveals that the 
degree of CBI increased three-fold during the study period and hovered around 6 during the 
penultimate stage of the study period, thus falling short of the maximum attainable score of 
10. The quarterly time-series CBI index compiled in this study is based on a reckoning of 
more dimensions of CBI and covers an extended time-span than only other time-series CBI 
compiled for Australia based on annual data (Stemp, 1997). 
 
NCIt (Neocorporatist Index) 
 
In this study the labour market distortions were proxied by computing a neocorporatist index 
to capture the degree of centralised wage fixing in a manner analogous to the cross-section  
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Table 4   Constituents of the Composite Central Bank Independence Index 
 
Central Bank Independence Indicator Further description 
1. Legal independence Tenure Turnover 
2. Conflict resolution Based on RBA Act , 1959 Dominance of Treasury  
3. Instrument independence Deficit finance (tap/tender) Money/ interest rate targets 
4. Goal independence NFL/interest/money targets Set by RBA /Government 
5. Final targets. Numerical inflation target Set by RBA/Government 
6. Transparency Disclosure of information Publication of reports 
7. Accountability Responsibility for targets RBA/Government 
 
 
neocorporatist index (Tarantelli, 1986). There are two conflicting macroeconomic paradigms 
proclaiming Pareto optimal wage outcomes that deliver the public good of low inflation. One 
is based on the Neo-Keynesian corporatist ethos, which favors centralized wage bargaining 
for low inflation wage outcomes. The other is based on the neoclassical frictionless labour 
market paradigm. During the 1970s centralised wage bargaining and rent-seeking by insiders 
led to a real wage outbreak and the incumbent Coalition government was on the verge of 
abolishing the centralised wage bargaining system when it was voted out of office. In 1983 
the Labor government introduced the Prices and Incomes Accord or the corporatist ethos. The 
early Accords delivered wage restraint and boosted job creation (Chapman and Gruen, 1990). 
However, starting with Accord Mk 3 there was a move towards enterprise bargaining and the 
erosion of neocorporatism. In the mid-1980s wage bargaining in Australia combined the 
centralist elements of an industry based award system with the elements of an occupation 
based trade union structure (Wooden and Sloan 1998). The resulting wage rigidity and 
inefficiency placed the Australian labor market outcomes in the middle of the Calmfors-
Driffill hump, which exhibited the worst of both worlds of the Neo-Keynesian and neo-
classical labour market paradigms (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). 
 
The evolution of the various Accords reveals the erosion of the corporatist ethos and the 
process is briefly sketched next. Accord Mk 1 & 2 (1983) relied on full wage indexation 
while Accord Mk 2 (1985) shifted to partial indexation; Accord Mk 3 (1987) adopted the 
restructuring and efficiency principles; Accord Mk 4 & 5 (1988, 1989) embraced the 
structural efficiency principle; Accord Mk 6 (1991) ushered in enterprise bargaining. Accord 
Mk 7 (1993) introduced the enterprise award principle with safety net adjustments. The 
election of the Coalition government occurred during the implementation of Accord Mk 8 
(1995). The new government announced its strategy for the deregulation of the labour market 
in line with the tenets of the neoclassical paradigm in the Workplace Reform Act (1996). This 
Act ushered in the first wave of industrial relations reforms pushing wage negotiations more 
in the direction of the market based neoclassical paradigm. 
 
The neocorporatist index (NCIt) aims to capture the effects of the conflicting paradigmatic 
forces that operated in the labour market during the study period through three important sub-
indices. These sub-indices refer to the trade union density (UNIt), the number of industrial 
disputes (DISt), and real earning (REAt) overhang. The latter measures the extent to which 
award wages exceed productivity. Finally, the effect of the Accord process on collective 
wage bargaining (CWBt) was estimated in a sub-index using a scoring system. The sum of 
these highly correlated sub-indices provides a measure of the degree of neocorporatism or 
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centralisation of wage fixing in the Australian labour market during the study period. Over 
the entire study period the composite NCIt index has decreased by about 30% indicating the 
gradual switch from the centralised or corporatist wage-fixing principles to the market based 
principles that are favoured by the incumbent conservative government. Table 5 below 
summarises the various constituents of the time-series NCIt  composite index. 
 
 
Table 5   The Neocorporatist Index (NCIt) 
 
Index Description Computation 
UNIt Trade union density 100(Union members/Workforce) 
DISt Industrial disputes 100(No. disputes/300) 
REAt Real Earnings 100(Real Earnings/104.2) 
CWBt Collective Bargaining 
+ Accord Effects 
Scores for centralised wage 
bargaining & Accord effects 
NCIt Neocorporatist Index NCIt=(UNIt+DISt+REAt+CWBt)/4 
 
 
BTXt (Benefits to Tax Revenue) Index  
 
A high ratio of welfare benefits funded by tax revenue or high benefits to tax revenue (BTXt) 
could be regarded as a proxy measure of tax distortion. There are numerous other equally 
controversial measures that could be proposed to proxy tax distortions, but for the purpose of 
this study the ratio of transfer payments and in particular the unemployment benefits are 
regarded as an important macroeconomic distortion that needs to be addressed by tax reform. 
Tax reform in Australia has highlighted the need to replace the Wholesale Sales Tax (WST) 
system introduced in the 1930s by a more modern Goods and Services Tax (GST). This 
would broaden the tax base and reduce the inefficiencies arising from multiple tax rates, 
numerous exceptions and other loopholes that provide opportunities for rent seeking by tax 
avoidance. In the current tax system the high transfer payments from tax revenue to fund 
welfare expenditure as captured in the BTXt ratio can be regarded as distortionary. High 
unemployment benefits as captured in a high BTXt ratio could increase the reservation wage 
in excess of labour productivity and thus shift the wage setting curve upwards. Furthermore, 
financing the unemployment benefits would require the imposition of higher taxes on the 
employed raising the tax wedge and generating disincentive effects causing a downward shift 
in the wage demand curve (Katz, 1998). Unemployment benefits, which are a critical 
component of the BTXt, have been more generous in countries such as Australia and some 
other European countries than in the USA. Empirical evidence shows that the high BTXt ratio 
generated by the high unemployment benefits gained by the rent seeking activities of insiders 
resulted in longer duration of spells of unemployment in countries like Australia than in the 
USA (Layard et al., 1991). Furthermore if the high unemployment rate leads to high ratios of 
long-term unemployed it could lead to skill atrophy and erosion of human capital causing an 
increase in the ratio of the long-term unemployed and triggering unemployment hysteresis. 
The removal of the tax distortion by honing down unemployment benefits could exacerbate 
income inequity and poverty and undermine the social cohesion the safety net welfare 
payments deliver. Therefore, radical solutions involving negative income taxes and tax 
credits have been mooted to overcome the adverse inegalitarian spillover effects that tax 
reform aimed at reducing unemployment benefits entails. In rectifying the distortionary 
effects of high welfare payments out of tax revenue the tax reformer faces a formidable 
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challenge in the balancing of the equity and efficiency goals. Although the welfare payments 
out of tax revenue may exacerbate inflation and unemployment and contribute to a 
distortionary tax system, it needs to be borne in mind that the equity and social cohesion that 
high welfare expenditure has delivered in some European countries has enabled the 
assignment of monetary policy to deliver the public good of low inflation and price stability 
(Prast, 1998). 
 
VOLt (Volatility) measure or a proxy for distortion of competitiveness 
 
The increase of international competitiveness in an open economy is vital for ensuring price 
stability and low inflation (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1992). However, the volatility of the index 
of international competitiveness or the real exchange rate can be regarded as a proxy measure 
of distortion. Such volatility undermines a country’s trade and investment prospects 
(Krugman, 1986; Dixit, 1989). For the purposes of this study the measure of international 
competitiveness based on trade-weighted bilateral exchange rates adjusted by trade-weighted 
world price indexes compiled for the TRYM model, was accepted as a good proxy for a real 
exchange rate and a measure of competitiveness. The log index of international 
competitiveness exhibited stochastic trends and had to be appropriately differenced to obtain 
the stationary series {yt}. Several different ARMA(p, q) models were fitted to the above 
series and the best fit model was selected using the maximum SBC (Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion) as suggested by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). The SBC results for the various 
ARMA models are reported below in Table 6 and the maximum value of the SBC suggests 
that ARMA (1,1) or AR (1) model best fits the series {yt}. 
 
 
Table 6  SBC for the choice of the best-fit ARMA (p, q) model 
 
p/q 0 1 3 4 
    0 168.86 169.98 166.69 167.09 
    1 171.25 172.91* 168.95 169.20 
    2 166.85 168.13 164.62 169.93 
    3 163.07 168.13 163.85 161.69 
 
 
The conditional variance or standard error of the best fit model, or AR (1) model could 
follow an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) process and its conditional 
standard error could be used to proxy volatility (Engle, 1982). The generalised ARCH or 
GARCH (1,1) process has been demonstrated to be a parsimonious fit to a higher order 
ARCH process (Bollerslev, 1986). Therefore in this study a GARCH (1,1) model was fitted 
to the errors of the AR (1) model and its conditional standard error was taken to proxy 
volatility (VOLt), the measure of international distortion used for empirical analysis. This 
measure of volatility, which doubles up as the proxy for distortions of international 
competitiveness, is reported as VOLt. 
 
 
6. A VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION MODEL (VECM) 
 
Here we report the specification of a VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) to provide 
insights into the short-run and long-run dynamics linking inflation, CBI and the 
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macroeconomic distortion variables identified earlier. The variables in the VECM are in logs 
and LINFt  has been linked to LCBIt and distortion variables LNCIt, LBTXt and LVOLt, first 
in levels as a general or Autoregressive Distributed Lag or ADL (k) model for the sample 
period 1973Q3-1998Q4 or as Model 1. The definition of variables, transformations and the 
data sources are reported in the Appendix.  
 
Model 1  
 
LINFt=β0+Σi=1k β1i LINFit+Σi=0k β2i LCBI it+ Σi=0kβ3i LNCI it+Σi=0k β4i LBTX it +  + Σi=1k β5i LVOL it +εt…………(1) 
 
An ADL (3) model passed a battery of diagnostic tests at 5% level of significance. The 
lagged residual of Model 1 provided the error correction mechanism (ECMt-1) or the proxy 
for the short-run adjustment process. 
 
Diagnostics for Model 1 
1974(2) –1998(3) 
AR 1-5F(5,69)  = 1.61 
ARCH 4F(4,66)  = 1.49 
Normalityχ2(2)  = 8.68 
HETxi^2 F (36,37) = 0.44 
RESET F (1,73)  = 0.15 
Forecast  χ2(4)   = 2.07 
Chow F (4,74)  = 0.48 
 
The model variables were tested for nonstationarity or unit roots using the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The ADF unit root test results are 
reported in Table 7 below and they indicate that most of the variables had to be first 
differenced to make them stationary or I (0).  
 
 
Table 7   ADF Unit Root Tests (with drift and trend) 1975Q2-1998Q3, n=94 
 
Variable (yt) SBC K t-adf I(d) Variable (∆yt) SBC K t-adf I(d) 
LINFt 85.09 1 -2.64 I(1) ∆LINFt 84.4 0 -6.12 I(0) 
LCBIt 947.0 4 -.005 I(1) ∆LCBIt 1681. 3 -32.5 I(0) 
LNCIt 64.42 0 -2.71 I(1) ∆LNCIt 158.9 0 -10.3 I(0) 
LBTXt 95.87 4 -2.80 I(1) ∆LBTXt 92.6 4 -3.4 ~I(0) 
CV α=.05 -3.46    CV α=.05 -3.46    
 
Notes: ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) test for the null hypothesis Ho that yt  has a unit root has been based on 
the equation with drift and trend: ∆yt =γ0 +γ1yt-1+Σi=1kβi∆yt-i+ εt.  The optimal lag length k to make the 
residuals white noise has been selected on the basis of the maximum SBC (Schwarz Bayesian Criterion) 
since it is asymptotically consistent and is not biased in favour of overparametrisation like the AIC  
(Akaike Information Criterion). In application across models the model selected is the one with the 
highest value of  SBCl=ln (θ)−plog(n)/2 (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997: 354) .  The unit root null for yt-1 was 
not rejected when |t-calc| < |t-adf |, where t-adf denotes the critical value (CV) for ADF test based on the 
relevant nonstandard underlying distribution. An ADF  yt(6) was used in the above calculations using 
MFIT. The order of integration is shown by I (d). 
 
Furthermore, the likelihood-ratio (LR) tests (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1991) 
based on the maximum eigen value or λ-max and λ−trace of the stochastic matrix indicated 
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that there were at least four cointegrating vectors spanning the five variables defining the 
monetary system and the test results are reported in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8    Johansen Cointegration LR- tests on the cointegrating vector 
xt =[LINFt, LCBIt, LNCIt ,LBTXt, LVOLt ] (unrestricted intercepts & trends) Var=2 
 
Null Ho: λ-max 95% CV λ−trace 95% CV 
R = 0 318.80*  37.07 485.79*  82.23 
R = 1   82.88*  31.00 166.99*  58.93 
R = 2   59.53*  24.35   84.11*  39.33 
R = 3   20.02  18.33   24.58*  23.83 
R = 4     4.56  11.54     4.56  11.54 
  * 95% level of significance 
 
Thus the Vector Error Correction Model or Model 2 was specified in terms of stationary or 
differenced variables or (∆) with an ECMt-1  thus obviating the dangers of spurious regression 
inferences (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Moreover the VECM model captured the short-run 
dynamics via the ECMt-1 as the Johansen tests confirmed that the variables were cointegrated 
and it follows from the Engle-Granger Representation theorem that there must by an ECMt-1 
linking the cointegrating variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). The VECM model was 
sequentially reduced using the general-to-specific or DHSY methodology (Davidson et al., 
1978) to arrive at a conformable parsimonious specification. For the purpose of this study 
variables with |t-statistic| < 1 were eliminated and the resultant parsimonious VECM Model 2 
has been reported below (see Table 9): 
 
Model 2 
 
∆LINFt=β0+Σi=1k β1i ∆LINF it +Σi=0k β1i ∆LCBI it+Σi=0k β2i  ∆LNCI it +Σi=0k β3i  ∆LBTX it +Σi=0k 
β4i  ∆LVOL it + ECMt-1 +εt …(2) 
 
 
Table 9   Model 2 ECM inflation dynamics model 19974(3) –1998(3) less 4 forecasts 
Dependent variable ∆LINFt 
 
Variable Coefficients |t-value| 
∆LINFt-1 0.3715 3.79** 
∆LINFt-2 0.2193 2.08** 
∆LINFt-3 0.0327 0.31 
∆LCBIt-1 -6.7899 3.01** 
∆LNCIt-1 -0.4623 1.97** 
∆LBTXt-1 0.0694 1.75* 
∆LVOLt-1 0.0346 0.96 
ECMt-1 -0.07193 2.75** 
Statistics R2=0.38 DW=2.08 
       Notes:  * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
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Diagnostics for Model 2 
 
AR 1-5F(5,80)  = 1.13 
ARCH 4F(4,77)  = 0.53 
Normalityχ2(2)  = 5.36 
HETxi^2 F (16,68) = 0.67 
RESET F (1,84)  = 0.52 
Forecast  χ2(4)  = 2.35 
Chow F (4,85)  = 0.55 
 
Model 2 provided the framework for the Granger causality tests incorporating the ECMt-1 
thereby avoiding any mis-specification bias (Granger, 1988). The Granger causality tests 
reported in Table 10 indicate that both the institutional variable of CBI and macroeconomic 
distortion variables all Granger cause inflation.  
 
 
Table 10   Granger causality tests incorporating the ECMt-1 
 
Linear restrictions on subset Walled F- statistic 
∆LINFt-1, ∆LINFt-2, ∆LINFt-3, ECMt-1 F(4,85)** 
∆LCBIt-1, , ECMt-1 F(2,85)=5.65** 
∆LNCIt-1,  ECMt-1 F(2,85)=5.07** 
∆LBTXt-1,  ECMt-1 F(2,85)=3.86* 
∆LVOLt-1,  ECMt-1 F(2,81)=4.64* 
   Notes: ** Significant at 1 % level; * Significant at 1 % level 
 
 
Thus, the Granger causality tests lend empirical support to the proposition that the 
institutional innovation of CBI and the focus of the policy reform debate to tackle the 
distortions that were proxied in the empirical analysis had firm macroeconomic foundations. 
It is noteworthy that the CBI institutional variable appears to exert a dominant influence on 
the reduction of inflation when compared to the other distortion variables. 
 
The VECM model was further augmented by the variables YGAP t and YGAP t 2 so that the 
coefficients could provide insights in to the historical sacrifice ratio (SR) and hysteresis 
respectively. YGAP t was the deviation of log GDP t from potential GDP t, where potential 
GDP t was calculated using the HP (Hordrick and Prescott, 1980) filter. The augmented 
VECM is reported as Model 3 in Table 11 and its long-run static equilibrium solution is also 
reported below it.  
 
The long-run model empirics reveal that the institutional innovation of Central Bank 
Independence (LCBI t) and the labour market distortion proxied by the neocorporatist index 
(LNCI t) both make significant contributions to the reduction of inflation. While the transfer 
payments to finance welfare benefits out of tax revenue (LBTX t) and distortions to 
international competition as proxied by the volatility measure (LVOL t) exacerbate inflation 
during the study period. Moreover, the error correction mechanism (ECM t-1) appears to be 
correctly signed indicating a move towards long-term equilibrium albeit at a slow speed.  
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Table 11   Model 3 ECM Model of Inflation Dynamics 
Dependent variable ∆LINFt 
 
Variable Coeff |t-value| 
∆LINFt-1 0.3586 3.66 
∆LINFt-2 0.2175 2.04 
∆LINFt-3 0.0264 0.25 
∆LCBIt-1 - 6.8131 2.75 
∆LNCIt-1 -0.4883 2.04 
∆LBTXt-1 0.0997 1.32 
∆LVOLt-1 -0.0379 1.06 
ECMt-1 -0.0780 2.61 
YGAPt 0.2227 1.00 
YGAPt2 -6.9948 1.60 
Statistics R2=0.40 DW=2.11 
 
 
Diagnostics for Model 3 
 
AR1-5F (5,78)  =1.08 
ARCH 4F(4,75)  =0.43 
Normalityχ2(2)  = 6.85 
HETxi^2 F (19,63) =0.80 
RESET F (1,82)  =0.32 
Forecast χ2(4)  =2.69 
Chow F (4,83)  =0.63 
 
 
Solved Static Long Run Equation for Model 3 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
∆LINFt = -17.13∆LCBIt – .23 ∆LNCIt + 0.25∆LBTXt +. 09∆LVOLt -. 20ECMt-1  
(SE)        (9.6)       (0.72)      (0.21)     (0.09) (0.11) 
 
  - 0.56YGAPt + 17.59YGAPt2 
(SE)  (0.69)   (12.81)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
According to Model 3 a 1% increase in central bank independence (LBCIt) contributed to a 
reduction of inflation by 6.8% during the study period, while a 1% increase in 
neocorporatism contributed to a 0.49% reduction in inflation (see Table 11). The long-run 
static solution indicates that a 1% increase in LCBIt and neocorporatism contribute inflation 
reduction by a massive 17% and 0.23% respectively. However, a 1-% increase in welfare 
payments out of tax revenue (LBTXt) and an increase in volatility (LVOLt), both contributed 
to an increase in inflation. Based on the long-run static solution the implicit historical 
Sacrifice Ratio (SR), given by the reciprocal of the coefficient of (YGAP t ), was estimated 
at1.8 or nearly 2 and the figure corresponds a similar estimate for an earlier period (Stevens, 
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1992). However, the SR is bound to vary considerably if it was calculated using the events 
methodology (Ball, 1994). The coefficient of (YGAP2 t ) also appears to be significant 
indicating the prevalence of hysteresis or persistence of the adverse effects of adverse shocks 
during the study period. 
 
Hysteresis or monetary non-neutrality postulates that high costs of disinflation could 
permanently lower the equilibrium level of GDP resulting in high loss of potential output 
(Akerlof et al., 1996). Besides, low inflation could blunt the effectiveness of monetary policy 
for output stabilisation by imposing a non-negativity constraint on real interest rate 
(Summers, 1989). Also, the costs of disinflation would be higher in terms of loss in potential 
output at low levels of inflation if the Phillips curve is non-convex (Laxton et al., 1995). 
Thus, hysteresis, the real interest constraint and non-convexity of the Phillips curve can 
arguably result in higher costs of disinflation than measured by the historical SR (Haldane, 
1997). However, it needs to be noted that these static and transitory costs measured by the 
historical SR appear to pale into insignificance compared to the permanent dynamic gains 
that can be generated by moving to a low steady state inflation environment through the 
implementation of disinflationary policies. According to the net present value of the benefits 
of disinflation as ratio of GDP could exceed 18% as shown earlier in Section 2. 
 
The VECM empirics confirm that the increase in CBI with the evolution of monetary policy 
in Australia has contributed more than any other variable in the monetary system to inflation 
reduction. However, the finding that the increase in neocorporatism reduces inflation 
challenges the need for labour market reforms aimed at a weakening of the neocorporatist 
ethos. Therefore, based on the VECM results one could infer that the agenda for labour 
market reforms could be based on ideological or partisan considerations and lack an 
economic rationale. However, since VECM empirics ignore the feedback effects to resolve 
the issue it is necessary to analyze the interactions between inflation and the variables in a 
system context taking feedback effects into account. The VAR methodology provides a 
vehicle for performing such an investigation. 
 
 
7.  VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION (VAR) ANALYSIS OF THE MONETARY 
SYSTEM INTERACTIONS 
 
In order to examine the feedback effects of CBI and macroeconomic distortions particularly 
in the labour market we have used the VAR methodology. An unrestricted five dimensional 
vector in levels, where xt =( LINFt, LCBIt, LNCIt, LBTXt, LVOLt) was specified to represent 
the monetary system. The use of levels rather than difference of variables has been 
recommended in order to avoid discarding information on co-movements among the 
variables (Sims, 1980; Doan, 1992). 
 
  B    xt     = Γ 0 +  Γ1  xt-1 +εt  Primitive Form 
  5x5   5x1           5x1       5x5  5x1    5x1   
 
  A   xt = Α0 +Α1xt-1 +et  Standard Form 
  5x5  5x1      5x1    5x5  5x1     5x1 
 
The identification of the primitive model required the imposition of restrictions on the error 
covariance matrix Σ or its orthogonalization using the Choleski decomposition. A sensitivity 
analysis revealed that the results of innovation accounting were quite robust and were 
unaffected by the ordering of the variables. Based on the Vector Moving Average 
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Representation (VMA) as given below, innovation accounting comprising of Impulse 
Response Functions (IRFs) and Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs)  should be 
implemented.  
 
  xt   = µ + Σ∞ i=0 φi εi 
 
The coefficients of the matrix φi give the impulse response functions or the time profile of 
variables when subject to a one standard deviation shock (Enders, 1995: 306). Figure 1 
reports the IRFs resulting from a one-standard deviation shock to an innovation or 
disturbance term in the monetary system. The confidence bands generated by 100 Monte-
Carlo simulations are also shown. The effects of the unit shocks are listed in the columns of 
the panels and the forecast horizons are shown on the rows of the panels in Figure 1. A 
positive unit innovation to the central bank independence (LCBIt) results in a permanent 
reduction in inflation of about 5% over the long run or forecast horizon beyond 4 quarters 
(Column 2, Panel 1, and Figure. 1). The unit innovation to LCBIt also weakens the 
neocorporatist index (LNCIt) in the short run without any discernible long-run effects either 
on neocorporatism or on the tax or international distortion indices (Column 2, Figure 1). 
 
A unit innovation in the neocorporatist index increases inflation in the short-run, reduces 
central bank independence in the long run, and increases neocorporatism in the short-run with 
the LNCI index reverting to its original level in the long run. The shock has no effects on the 
tax or international competitiveness indices in the long-run (Column3, Figure 1).  The VAR 
impulse response empirics taking feedback effects into account indicate that the positive unit 
shock or the strengthening of neocorporatism manifests itself in the form of high inflation in 
the short run, although not in the long run. Therefore the VAR impulse response empirics 
provide evidence to support the case for labour market reforms aimed at weakening elements 
of neocorporatism that have adverse feedback on inflation (Column 3, Figure 1). 
 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) Analysis  
 
The Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) analysis quantifies how much of the 
variation of a shock can be attributed to the variable itself and how much can be apportioned 
to other variables in the system. The relative importance of the five shocks over various 
forecasting horizons can be examined further using FEVDs. The variation in the system 
variables caused by 100% inflation (LINFt) is mostly accounted for by itself over the short 
run of the first 4 quarters. After 8 quarters the labour market distortion proxied by (LNCIt) 
accounts for about 23% of the variation caused by the shock and it nearly doubles to 41% in 
the long run after 24 quarters. These findings indicate that the inflation shocks while having 
impacts on itself in the short-run in the long-run through the rise in inflationary expectations 
affects labour market distortions. This could result in pressures wage renegotiations and are  
captured by the neocorporatist index (LNCIt). The variation caused by the inflation shock on 
the tax and central bank independence indicators or (LTBXt ) and (LCBIt ) are small 
accounting for 4% and 2% of the FEVD respectively of a 100% inflation shock (LINFt) after 
24 quarters.  The variation of the inflation shock impacts mostly on itself in the short run and 
affects the labour market distortion variable considerably in the long run while registering 
only negligible effects on the welfare benefits form tax revenue or the exchange rate volatility 
indicators (See Panel 1, Table 12). 
 
In the case of a 100% shock to central bank independence (LCBIt) more than 90% of the 
FEVD of the shock is accounted for by itself in the short run or the first 4 quarters with no 
effects on other variables in the system. However, after 12 quarters the FEVD of the central  
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bank independence shock on the labour market (LNCIt) increases to nearly 55% of the FEVD 
whilst the (LCBIt) index itself accounts only for only 37% of the FEVD. Thus, any 
innovation on LCBIt has greater implications for the labour market distortions than for any 
other variable in the system. (See Panel 2, Table 11). A 100% shock to the labour market 
distortion (LNCIt) is accounted for mostly by itself in the short run, but after about 12 
quarters nearly 5% each of the FEVD due to the shock is accounted for by inflation (LINFt) 
and welfare benefits (LBTXt) indicators whilst nearly 87% of the shock is still accounted for 
by (LNCIt) itself, suggesting that it is an endogenous variable. (See Panel 3, Table 12). 
 
 
Table 12   Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs) 
 
Horizon LINFt LCBIt LNCIt LBTXt LVOLt 
LINFt     1   100.0  0.0    0.0 0.0 0.00 
              4   96.78  0.05   1.36 1.74 0.06 
            12   61.78  1.49 32.16 4.24 0.32 
            24   51.65  2.13 41.24 4.52 0.47 
LCBIt    1        4.43  95.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
              4     7.86  90.86 1.17 0.05 0.06 
            12     5.73  36.95  54.85 2.55 0.07 
            24     4.32  22.94 68.97 3.49 0.27 
LNCIt    1     0.46    4.21 95.32 0.00 0.00 
              4     0.21    5.06 89.30 4.40 1.03 
            12     1.26    5.54 87.41 4.74 1.04 
            24     1.80    5.76 86.58 4.84 1.02 
LBTXt   1     1.62    0.80  0.09 97.49 0.00 
              4     5.81    1.07  5.88 86.77 0.46 
            12     7.08    1.09  8.54 82.73 0.54 
            24     7.05    1.89 11.01 80.20 0.55 
LVOLt  1     2.86    2.10   0.26   2.38 92.40 
             4     5.34    2.04   1.44   2.55 86.62 
           12     5.39    2.07   3.87   3.00 85.67 
           24     5.39    2.09   4.53   3.03 84.96 
 
 
8.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The evolution of monetary policy design in Australia over the past quarter of a century has 
revealed that although the RBA changed the policy instruments and targets periodically, the 
ultimate goal of monetary policy remained steadfastly committed to the attainment of low 
inflation and price stability. Based on the theoretical framework of constrained minimization 
of a quadratic loss function subject to a Lucas supply constraint, it was demonstrated that 
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exclusive focus on the institutional mechanisms of CBI to deliver low inflation might be 
flawed. Such an institutional approach to curbing inflation ignores the important adverse 
spillover effects macroeconomic distortions may have on inflation by causing output to 
deviate from potential output. Tuning into the ongoing debate on policy reforms identified 
several macroeconomic distortions. Composite time-series indices were constructed for both 
CBI and the macroeconomic distortions. Thereafter a parsimonious Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) was specified to investigate the empirical nexus between macroeconomic 
distortions and the inflation rate after controlling for CBI. 
 
The VECM empirics clearly demonstrated that gradual evolution and strengthening of CBI 
made a dominant contribution to inflation reduction in Australia during the study period. 
Furthermore, macroeconomic distortions also had significant causal effects in either 
ameliorating or exacerbating inflation. In particular, the labour market distortion proxied by 
the neocorporatist index (LNCIt) appeared to have curbed inflation during the study period. 
This finding questions whether the contemporary agenda of industrial relation reforms aimed 
at weakening the neocorporatist ethos was motivated by partisan ideology rather than by an 
economic rationale. The VECM empirics clearly revealed that the welfare expenditure from 
tax revenue (LBTXt) and the volatility (LVOLt) distorting international competition 
contributed to the exacerbation of inflation. Therefore, the empirics provide support for 
pursuing policy measures to remove these macroeconomic distortions. 
 
On review of the perverse result of neocorporatism and inflation based on the VECM 
empirics it was noted that the VECM approach failed to take account of the feedback effects 
of the macroeconomic distortion variables on inflation. This was remedied by re-analyzing 
the inflation and distortion dynamics using the VAR methodology. The impulse response 
functions from the VAR analytics revealed that the increase in neocorporatism in the short-
run exacerbated inflation due to adverse feedback effects. Thus, the VAR empirics provide 
the missing economic rationale for the current agenda of labour market reforms aimed at 
whittling down neocorporatism. 
 
The empirical results from both VECM and VAR modeling clearly demonstrate that besides 
the institutional mechanism of CBI, the macroeconomic distortions have significant spillover 
effects on inflation. This has significant implications for the for the monetary policy reaction 
function. The manipulation of the short-term interest rate (the cash rate) to achieve the 
inflation target should therefore not only take into consideration the deviation of inflation 
from the target (πt -π∗) but also real GDP from potential GDP (yt-y*). A policy reaction 
function that follows such an approach would be consistent with the Taylor rule. The Taylor 
rule posits that that the short term interest rate (the overnight cash rate) should be adjusted on 
the basis of both deviation of inflation from the target (the inflation gap or igapt) and output 
from potential (output gap or ygapt) (Taylor, 1993; Bryant et al., 1993). In this study the 
policy reaction parameters of the Taylor policy reaction function were estimated 
econometrically using quarterly time-series data for the study period 1973Q3-1998Q3. The 
Taylor equation was also augmented by an error correction mechanism (ecmt-1) to take 
account of the practice of interest rate smoothing or small step adjustments of the cash rate on 
in accordance with the suggestions of Judd and Rudebusch (1998). Furthermore open 
economy effects were incorporated in the Taylor policy reaction function by adding a proxy 
for the real exchange rate gap (the deviation of real exchange rate as measured by the real 
trade weighted index from its equilibrium value or regt) as suggested by Ball (1997). 
Applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter derived all the equilibrium values for the inflation rate, 
the real exchange rate and the GDP giving potential GDP. The estimation was done using log 
transforms of the variables. The econometric estimate of the Taylor policy reaction function 
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linking the change in the short-term interest rate (∆lstit) to the inflation gap and output gap 
and the real exchange gap with an error correction mechanism is reported below: 
 
(∆lstit)= 0.00001 + 0.0003ligapt +0.01644lygapt -0.0717lreg t-0.0854ecmt-1 
|t-stat| (0.94)  (0.96)  (2.26)  (1.37)  (2.64) 
 
The augmented Taylor rule indicates that the change in the overnight cash rate ((∆lstit) has 
reacted more to the deviation of output from potential rather than to deviation of inflation 
from the target level during the study period. Moreover, the appreciation of the real exchange 
rate may appear to have contributed to deflation and induced a downward adjustment of the 
short-term rate. Also the significance of the error correction mechanism (ECMt-1) indicates 
that policy makers have engaged in interest rate smoothing rather than sharp adjustment of 
the short-term interest rate to achieve the inflation target during the study period.  
The non-nested test results indicated that Model 1 or the Taylor rule dominated Model 2 or 
the inflation rate only rule as an efficient mechanism for the setting the overnight cash rate to 
achieve the inflation target. The non-nested small sample W and NT tests based on the 
modification of the Cox test qualify on the basis of power and size as good tests when 
compared to the asymptotic J-test due to Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) according to 
(Pesaran, 1982). The W and NT tests clearly favor the Taylor rule over the inflation rate only 
rule for inflation targeting in Australia. Besides, these small sample test results are supported 
by the model choice criteria: the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and the SBC 
(Schwarz Bayesian Criterion). Both criteria favor the Taylor rule (Model 1) over Inflation 
Rate only Model 2 (see Table 13).  
 
Table 13   Non-nested tests of Taylor rule vs. inflation only rule 
 
Test statistic M1 vs M2 M2 vs M1 
NT-test -1.42 (0.16) -2.08 (.04) 
W-test -1.41 (0.16) -2.04 (.04) 
J-test  2.40 (0.02)  2.46 (.01) 
Encompassing (F1,94)  5.34 (0.02)  5.47 (.01) 
AIC M1 vs M2  1.54 Favors M1 
SBC M1 vs M2  0.24 Favors M1 
Notes:  The NT and W- tests are regarded as robust small sample tests as 
they qualify on the criteria of power and size (Pesaran, 1982). 
The J-test (Davidson an MacKinnon, 1981) is an asymptotic test. 
The model selection criteria refer to the Akaike Unformation 
(AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The tests and 
criteria are discussed in detail in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997): 
355-356. 
 
The empirical results based on VECM and VAR methodologies both underscore the 
important contribution that reinforcing of the institutional mechanism of CBI has played in 
curbing inflation bias in Australia during the study period. Nonetheless, the empirical 
findings caution against the cavalier treatment of the macroeconomic distortions that have 
adverse feedback effects on inflation. The econometric results from the augmented Taylor 
policy reaction function provide clear guidelines to policymakers for the efficient targeting of 
inflation when macroeconomic distortions matter. Macroeconomic policy distortions cause 
deviation of output from potential and no doubt contribute to preference uncertainty of 
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agents. These distortions have to be considered in the formulation of efficient policy reaction 
functions for the efficient implementation of inflation targeting policy. This suggests that in 
smoothing the overnight cash rate to achieve the pre-announced inflation target in an efficient 
manner the Reserve Bank of Australia should pursue the Taylor ’s rule rather than an 
Inflation Rate only policy reaction function. 
 
 
Variable Transformations and Data Sources 
 
INFt : Underlying Inflation Rate=100[pt -pt-1 ]/ pt-1; where pt =log(Pt). Pt: Underlying CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) is computed by subtracting from the headline CPI volatile price 
items such as fresh fruit and vegetables, mortgage interest rate charges, consumer credit 
charges, auto fuel and health services. These adjustments have also through splicing 
eliminated series in the headline CPI series. (Sources: ABS Catalogue 6410.0. & Treasury). 
 
CBIt: The central bank independence composite index was a simple average of the sum of ten 
sub-indices of various aspects of legal and policy independence as detailed in Table 3A, 
Appendix. The quarterly values of the composite LCBIt index was generated by fitting a 
trend to the annual observations of the composite LCBIt index. 
 
Source: Table 2A (Appendix)  
 
BTXt :Social Benefit Expenditure to Tax Revenue Ratio  
Source: Cat. 5206.0 ABS 
 
NCIt : Neocorporatist Index a composite of UNI (Trade Union Density)+ DIS (Number of 
Industrial Disputes) + REA (Real Earnings) + CWB (Degree of Centralized Wage Bargaining 
and Accord Effects).  Sources: ABS Labour forces statistics 
 
VOLt : The best fit ARMA(p,q) model for the index of international competitiveness (IOCt) . 
was an AR(1) model. The conditional variance of the AR(1) model revealed the existence of 
a higher order ARCH process. It was captured parsimoniously by a GARCH (1,1) model and 
its conditional standard deviation has been used to measure volatility (VOLt) which acts as 
the proxy to measure the distortions in international competitiveness. 
 
Sources. RBA and the DX-database. 
 
YGAPt : Is the deviation of log GDP=yt from it s potential proxied by the Hordrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter using as smoothing parameter λ=1600, for quarterly data (Hordrick and Prescott, 
1980) giving the smoothed value yt. 
 
The smoothed value yt comprises of a sum of the a degree of fit and a degree of smoothness 
term, where ytf :is the fitted value and therefore 
yt=  min Σt=1T( yt - ytf )2 + λ [Σt=2T-1(yt+1f - ytf )2−( ytf- yt-1f )]2                                                   
Source: GDP=yt, National Accounts. Cat. 5206.0 ABS. 
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